Tell Me Who Your Friends Are and I’ll Tell You Who You Are: Privacy and the Social Self

This article aims to establish conceptual and philosophical foundations for the debate on privacy. It proposes three necessary requirements for any privacy theory: determining the nature of the privacy bearer, distinguishing between privacy and the right to privacy, and differentiating between the means and ends of privacy.<br><br>The article challenges the prevailing atomistic view of selfhood and autonomy in privacy theories by drawing on George Herbert Mead's work on the social constitution of selfhood. A nuanced conceptualization of privacy is presented, defining it as a state where an individual's diverse social selves are maintained distinct according to their desires and expectations.<br><br>A distinction is made between privacy as a subjective state and the right to privacy as the right to achieve or maintain that state. The right to privacy is understood as the right to maintain one's state of privacy based on personal wishes and reasonable expectations.<br><br>The article explores the values underlying the relational account of privacy and the right to privacy, highlighting autonomy, dignity, respect, and trust as foundational values within this framework.<br><br>The theoretical challenge posed by surveillance, including surreptitious surveillance and surveillance conducted by automatic systems, is examined in the context of a relational conceptualization of privacy. These challenges are addressed, and possible implications of the theory are explored.<br><br>By establishing this philosophical conceptualization of privacy, this article provides a solid foundation for legal frameworks and public policy. It emphasizes the social nature of privacy, the distinction between privacy and the right to privacy, and the values that underpin privacy in a relational context. Ultimately, the article contributes to a deeper understanding of privacy and its implications in contemporary society.