The Paradox of Social Instability in China and the Role of the Xinfang System

Against a backdrop of rapid social upheaval in contemporary China, this paper analyzes the paradoxical role of the xinfang system in producing social instability. Xinfang (literally "letters" and "visits") is an informal, dispute resolution system that serves as a the dominant method of handling citizens' grievances against the government. Originally designed as a political tool for social control, xinfang bureaus are not well-suited to this function. Politically demanding citizens have thrust this venerable institution into new roles with problematic results. This paper focuses on how the xinfang system's elevated the expectations of the average citizens' expectations for their government and how the failure of the system to live up to those heightened expectations has helped to create social unrest. This unrest has grown because of the development of a body of sophisticated and disaffected petitioners who are able to manipulate the xinfang system. <br><br>As the system's flaws manifest itself vis-a-vis more frequent, prolonged, widespread and broad-based expressions of social unrest, the regime will need to be ready to implement significant reforms in order to prevent the further spread of such unrest. This paper explores the transformation of the venerable xinfang system from a political tool for social control into a destabilizing force and concludes that it is citizens' growing rights awareness, a liberalized political opportunity structure and a willingness to act contentiously that are causing these changes. The paper concludes with an analysis of some impediments faced by the regime in its efforts to reform, including a resource constraint, the political costs of repressing or reversing citizens' heightened expectations for China's nascent legal system, and the contradiction of having parallel, but not mutually exclusive systems, of dispute resolution.