Tullock, Downs, and Majority Rule

<p><span>Gordon Tullock’s engagement with Anthony Downs over the limitations of majority voting proved an important impetus to the writing of <i>Calculus of Consent</i> (1962), Virginia Political Economy, and the broader social choice research program. </span><span>Despite much work on the origins of Virginia Political Economy and <i>Calculus</i>, </span><span>the circumstances and motivations underlying the Tullock and Downs 1958 – 1960 exchanges remain obscure. </span><span>In this paper, we reconstruct how the rapid evolution in Tullock’s thinking was sparked by his engagement with Downs through a series of papers, replies, rejoinders, and letters. We demonstrate how their works are </span><span>inextricably linked, and how the intellectual stimulation and substantive disagreements between Downs and Tullock precipitated important advances. </span><span>From his initial exploration into the limits of majority voting, Tullock was pushed to consider a range of potential solutions that included logrolling and other compensation schemes. Finding these insufficient, Tullock turned his attention to the rules of the game and the meta-conditions under which collective decisions are made. &nbsp;</span><i><span>&nbsp;&nbsp;</span></i><span></span></p>