The Max U Approach: Prudence-Only, or Not Even Prudence? A Smithian Perspective

McCloskey criticizes Samuelsonian economists for representing human beings in their models by a character she dubs Max U. Max U, she argues, lacks all virtues except for Prudence. The paper explores whether the identity between Max U and Prudence is tenable and whether Samuelsonian economics can be interpreted as a study of Prudence. I juxtapose Max U to the concept of Prudence as it appears in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). The reason is twofold: 1) McCloskey assumes stability in the meaning of Prudence from Aristotle to Samuelson and hence any concept of Prudence would work; 2) TMS occupies a prominent position in her argument. I attempt to show that utility maximization is a process distinct from practical reasoning underlying the virtue of Prudence and Samuelsonian economics can therefore not be interpreted as a study of Prudence.