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David Hume
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In this chapter the author presents Hume’s “skeptical” argument for the conclusion that there is no rational link between our observational and memorial/observational knowledge of the world and our theories about it, and defends it at length against the objection that it fails to consider probabilistic connections between evidence and theory. The author also defends Hume’s claim that our most elementary inferences are not made by any process of reasoning, but by habit and custom, against the charge that it fails to solve the problem of the missing rational link. His critics have misunderstood his claim, which is simply to have identified the means by which we arrive at the conclusions of those inferences. The author then presents Hume’s solution to the problem they have in mind, namely how any of our inductive inferences are justified: reflective equilibrium theory.
Title: David Hume
Description:
In this chapter the author presents Hume’s “skeptical” argument for the conclusion that there is no rational link between our observational and memorial/observational knowledge of the world and our theories about it, and defends it at length against the objection that it fails to consider probabilistic connections between evidence and theory.
The author also defends Hume’s claim that our most elementary inferences are not made by any process of reasoning, but by habit and custom, against the charge that it fails to solve the problem of the missing rational link.
His critics have misunderstood his claim, which is simply to have identified the means by which we arrive at the conclusions of those inferences.
The author then presents Hume’s solution to the problem they have in mind, namely how any of our inductive inferences are justified: reflective equilibrium theory.
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