Evil Law in St. Thomas Aquinas's Philosophy

In this paper, I argue that St. Thomas Aquinas's account of evil as privation holds a key to understanding the nature of extremely morally iniquitous (or 'evil') law of the kind found in regimes such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin. Firstly, I clarify the relationship between different ways in which the concept of evil can be framed, from the broad concept of malum to a narrower one of iniustia to the most specific one of evil law, arguing that Aquinas's remarks apply to all. Secondly, I identify two propositions about evil presented by Aquinas-that good is metaphysically prior to evil (the Primacy Thesis) and that good causes evil in that the latter would not exist but for the former (the Causality Thesis). Thirdly, I apply these propositions to evil law. On the Primacy Thesis, I claim that while one may question whether evil law is law proper, it is nevertheless parasitic on good law in that the former cannot exist without the latter. On the Causality Thesis, I argue that the very legal form, through providing coercive and coordinative powers, is inherently risky as it can be misused by evil regimes for their aims.