Javascript must be enabled to continue!
Optimal Bidding Strategies for Online Ad Auctions with Overlapping Targeting Criteria
View through CrossRef
We analyze the problem of how to optimally bid for ad spaces in online ad auctions. For this we consider the general case of multiple ad campaigns with overlapping targeting criteria. In our analysis we first characterize the structure of an optimal bidding strategy. In particular, we show that an optimal bidding strategies decomposes the problem into disjoint sets of campaigns and targeting groups. In addition, we show that pure bidding strategies that use only a single bid value for each campaign are not optimal when the supply curves are not continuous. For this case, we derive a lower-bound on the optimal cost of any bidding strategy, as well as mixed bidding strategies that either achieve the lower-bound, or can get arbitrarily close to it.
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Title: Optimal Bidding Strategies for Online Ad Auctions with Overlapping Targeting Criteria
Description:
We analyze the problem of how to optimally bid for ad spaces in online ad auctions.
For this we consider the general case of multiple ad campaigns with overlapping targeting criteria.
In our analysis we first characterize the structure of an optimal bidding strategy.
In particular, we show that an optimal bidding strategies decomposes the problem into disjoint sets of campaigns and targeting groups.
In addition, we show that pure bidding strategies that use only a single bid value for each campaign are not optimal when the supply curves are not continuous.
For this case, we derive a lower-bound on the optimal cost of any bidding strategy, as well as mixed bidding strategies that either achieve the lower-bound, or can get arbitrarily close to it.
Related Results
The introduction of the printed book auction catalogue
The introduction of the printed book auction catalogue
AbstractBook historians have generally seen the introduction of the printed book auction catalogue as an important event in the history of the book trade. Catalogues were already b...
The Synergy of Double Neural Networks for Bridge Bidding
The Synergy of Double Neural Networks for Bridge Bidding
Artificial intelligence (AI) has made many breakthroughs in the perfect information game. Nevertheless, Bridge, a multiplayer imperfect information game, is still quite challenging...
Automated Bidding for Sponsored Ads on E-commerce Platforms
Automated Bidding for Sponsored Ads on E-commerce Platforms
<p><span>E-commerce platforms such as Amazon offer sellers an automated targeted bidding system for sponsored ads known as dynamic bidding that optimizes a seller's bid...
Risk- & Regret-Averse Bidders in Sealed-Bid Auctions
Risk- & Regret-Averse Bidders in Sealed-Bid Auctions
Overbidding, bidding more than risk-neutral Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, is a widely observed phenomenon in virtually all experimental auctions. The scholars within the auction liter...
Optimal Bidding Strategies and Equilibria in Dynamic Auctions with Budget Constraints
Optimal Bidding Strategies and Equilibria in Dynamic Auctions with Budget Constraints
How should agents bid in repeated sequential auctions when they are budget constrained? A motivating example is that of sponsored search auctions, where advertisers bid in a sequen...
Recurring Auctions with Costly Entry: Theory and Evidence
Recurring Auctions with Costly Entry: Theory and Evidence
Recurring auctions are ubiquitous for selling durable assets, such as land, home, or artwork: When the seller cannot sell the item in the initial auction, she often holds a subsequ...
Detecting Shill Bidding in Online English Auctions
Detecting Shill Bidding in Online English Auctions
Shill bidding is where spurious bids are introduced into an auction to drive up the final price for the seller, thereby defrauding legitimate bidders. While shilling is recognized ...
Detecting Shill Bidding in Online English Auctions
Detecting Shill Bidding in Online English Auctions
Shill bidding is where spurious bids are introduced into an auction to drive up the final price for the seller, thereby defrauding legitimate bidders. While shilling is recognized ...

