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A General Model for Epistemic State Revision using Plausibility Measures

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In this paper, we present a general revision model on epistemic states based on plausibility measures proposed by Friedman and Halpern. We propose our revision strategy and give some desirable properties, e.g., the reversible and commutative properties. Moreover, we develop a notion called plausibility kinematics and show that our revision strategy follows plausibility kinematics. Furthermore, we prove that the revision following plausibility kinematics satisfies the principle of minimal change based on some distance measures. Finally, we discuss a revision operator defined for plausibility functions and its relationship with iterated belief revision proposed by Darwiche and Pearl. We show that the revision operator satisfies all the DP postulates when it is Max-Additive.
Title: A General Model for Epistemic State Revision using Plausibility Measures
Description:
In this paper, we present a general revision model on epistemic states based on plausibility measures proposed by Friedman and Halpern.
We propose our revision strategy and give some desirable properties, e.
g.
, the reversible and commutative properties.
Moreover, we develop a notion called plausibility kinematics and show that our revision strategy follows plausibility kinematics.
Furthermore, we prove that the revision following plausibility kinematics satisfies the principle of minimal change based on some distance measures.
Finally, we discuss a revision operator defined for plausibility functions and its relationship with iterated belief revision proposed by Darwiche and Pearl.
We show that the revision operator satisfies all the DP postulates when it is Max-Additive.

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