John Stuart Mill, soft paternalism and mental capacity

The conventional interpretation of John Stuart Mill’s position on paternalism leads to his classification as a “moderate anti-paternalist.” While he generally rejects paternalism, Mill concedes certain exceptions to the harm principle, most notably regarding the legitimacy of paternalistic interventions toward individuals who, for various reasons, are incapable of making autonomous decisions. Although this “orthodox” reading finds support in several well-known passages of On Liberty, this study contends that attributing this position to Mill can be partly the result of perceiving soft paternalism as being morally uncontroversial. By challenging the morally non-controversial character of soft paternalism, it becomes possible to interpret Mill not as an advocate of unrestricted paternalism toward those incapable of self- determination, but rather as a thinker acutely aware of the moral tensions inherent in such forms of intervention.