The Question of Linguistic Idealism

Abstract The chapters in this collection address the question to what extent the doctrine of linguistic idealism is coherent and plausible. This position holds that the existence and the structure of the world are in some sense dependent on the existence and the structure of language. The interest of the thesis is that, since human language is an evolved, empirical phenomenon, it would be surprising and significant if the world, which existed long before human beings came into being and is in many respects quite obviously independent of them, were somehow beholden to the fact that human beings can talk about it. That, nevertheless, is the claim. Some of the chapters in this collection are favourable to this position in one version or another; others attack it. All the contributions are both historically aware and engaged with systematic considerations, but in some the emphasis is placed on historical aspects of the problem—here the focus is particularly on the writings of Kant and Wittgenstein—whereas others adopt a more systematic approach. All the authors are philosophers and address their chosen aspect of the general topic in (broadly speaking) metaphysical terms, but the bearing of modern linguistic theory on the thesis of linguistic idealism, as well as its connections with mathematical results and practice, also play a role in some of the contributions. The collection is prefaced by an introduction which presents a general argument for linguistic idealism and examines the way in which that position figures in the writings of Wittgenstein and Anscombe.