Against the Tyranny of Outcomes

AbstractThe book canvasses two sets of seemingly powerful arguments, the first that outcome-centered ethics cannot be wrong, the second that it cannot be right. It proceeds to undermine the arguments that outcome-centered ethics cannot be wrong, in the process providing additional support for the arguments that it cannot be right. Rooting out the mistaken grounding for outcome-centered ethics, it argues, involves rooting out the outcome-centered accounts of value, attitudes, reasons, and actions upon which the case for outcome-centered ethics depends, together with the considerations that have been offered to support them. The ethical and intuitive arguments for outcome-centered ethics are implausible (Chapters 2 and 3), the outcome-centered accounts of attitudes, reasons, and actions that form the cornerstone of the non-ethical argument for outcome-centered ethics are implausible (Chapters 4 and 5), and the considerations offered to shore up such outcome-centered accounts either themselves turn on the same equivocations that undermine the ethical arguments or depend upon highly controversial positions in metaphysics and the theory of action (Chapter 6). The result is a comprehensive argument for rejecting these outcome-centered accounts, in the process stepping outside of this toxic outcome-centered circle. The final chapter points to only a few of the many significant implications of this comprehensive rejection of the tyranny of outcomes, with particular focus upon our democratic and legal practices. It demonstrates that outcome-centered accounts lead agents away from the quest for good reasons of the right kind and towards appeal to the wrong kinds of reasons, and to bad reasons of the right kind.