Meaning, the History of Philosophy, and Analytical Philosophy

Abstract Chapter 7 considers the consequences of the Parmenidean Ascent with regard to meaning for the alleged distinction between philosophy and the study of its history. The argument that any such distinction is unintelligible focuses on the disregard of the history of philosophy in certain quarters of analytical philosophy. The argument identifies three pillars or struts of analytical philosophy: realism, the method of intuition or common sense, and discreteness in metaphysics. The chapter then shows how each of these three struts is implicated in the disdain for or ignoring of the history of philosophy. Rejecting an isolationist response to this analytical forgetfulness—a response that separates the study of the history of philosophy from philosophy itself—the chapter goes on to challenge the struts of analytical philosophy and to make a Parmenidean Ascent with regard to the distinction between philosophy and the study of its history.