Misinformation, Disinformation, and Political Liberalism

Abstract Rawls’s Political Liberalism (PL) defends a political conception of justice that can serve as a just, stable, and legitimate basis for political cooperation, despite the fact of reasonable pluralism. However, while Rawls’s theory grapples seriously with disagreements about morality, religion, and philosophical theories, he assumes that agreement about matters of fact and basic public values can ground public political justification. Yet mis- and disinformation are pervasive in contemporary society. This chapter investigates the extent to which mis- and disinformation pose challenges to the well-ordered society of PL and whether political liberalism can offer insights for tackling mis- and disinformation in a non-ideal world. The chapter begins by defining misinformation and disinformation. It then investigates two ways Rawls’s theory might initially appear to be insulated from mis- and disinformation: his use of ideal theory and his bracketing of the truth of comprehensive doctrines. Despite these idealizations, this chapter argues that mis- and disinformation foment distrust in one’s fellow citizens in ways that threaten both the legitimacy and stability of Rawls’s well-ordered society. It concludes by arguing that Rawls’s theory offers lessons for responding to mis- and disinformation in a non-ideal world. Drawing on Rawls’s distinction between “reasonable” and “unreasonable” is productive for guiding different methods of combatting mis- and disinformation by differentiating between those who believe misinformation and those disinformers who intentionally spread false and misleading claims.