Experience and the A Priori

Abstract There has been some recent scepticism regarding the a priori–a posteriori distinction, which is in part explained by the lack of a compelling account of independence of experience. This chapter offers a novel account of the a priori–a posteriori distinction in defence of its coherence and significance by accounting for the conditions under which experience plays a justificatory role. An adequate account of the distinction should meet the following desiderata: it should (i) correctly classify uncontroversial cases of a priori and a posteriori knowledge, it should (ii) do so in a way that explains and elucidates the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, and it should (iii) potentially cast light on controversial cases that are not easy to classify as a priori or a posteriori. This chapter argues that the best accounts on offer fail to meet at least one of these desiderata, and that the account proposed here meets all three of them. It concludes by illustrating how the account can be used to defend the significance of the a priori–a posteriori distinction by briefly addressing Timothy Williamson’s famous challenge to it.