Platformization and Infrastructuring in Web3

This dissertation investigates how tokenised claims and algorithmic governance reshape interactions in Web3, with a particular focus on business-to-business (B2B) settings. Building on the insight that digital platforms and infrastructures are mutually entangled—platforms acquiring infrastructural roles and infrastructures accumulating platform logics—the study examines how this entanglement reappears in blockchain-based systems and what it means for value creation, value distribution, and institutional control. Rather than assuming decentralization as an outcome, the dissertation asks how governance is actually assembled across code, organizations, and markets, and how these assemblies channel rights, risks, and rents over time. In this sense, the thesis extends platform/infrastructure scholarship into the Web3 domain, showing how infrastructuring and platformization remain co-constitutive under new technical conditions (e.g., programmable settlement, public ledgers, composability). The research is guided by the following question: How does algorithmic governance of tokenised claims affect dynamics of value creation and distribution in Web3? The thesis addresses a gap in extant work by analysing the combined economic and governance consequences of tokenisation in commercial contexts, rather than treating governance as either purely technical (smart contracts) or purely institutional (foundations, standards, regulators). Methodologically, this research adopts a qualitative, interpretive design centred on semi-structured interviews with founders and leads of Web3 projects oriented toward commercialization and enterprise use. Interview evidence is triangulated with document analysis (white papers, governance docs, upgrade logs) to trace how decision rights are allocated, which boundary resources act as chokepoints, and how incentives and accountability are engineered. The sample focuses on projects that tokenise rights and obligations to orchestrate inter-firm exchanges (e.g., guarantees, attribution, royalties), enabling a consistent comparison of governance choices and their distributional signatures. Theoretically, the thesis contributes a layered view of Web3 governance that differentiates transaction governance (smart-contract rules that execute exchanges) from platform governance (meta-rules that structure participation, evolution, and control)—layers that are interdependent yet analytically distinct. Across cases, transaction governance supplies deterministic settlement (escrows, splits, auctions), while platform governance defines constitutional levers (eligibility schemas, listings, parameter updates, treasury policy, emergency powers). This distinction clarifies why “more on-chain” does not automatically imply “more decentralised”: instruments can be automated while decision rights remain concentrated. The framing resonates with and extends platform governance scholarship that locates governance in the ongoing division of decision rights, control mechanisms, and incentives among interdependent actors. Empirically, the thesis identifies three governance models—monocentric, moderately polycentric (P2), and highly polycentric (P1)—and analyses how each allocates rights and rents. Monocentric configurations recentre constitutional authority in a focal hub (firm, foundation, tightly bonded coalition), delivering speed, legal legibility, and coherent risk management, while concentrating surplus upstream via control of boundary resources (standards, registries, upgrade cadence, listings). Moderately polycentric arrangements disperse constitutional authority across overlapping venues (token voters, stewards, committees, standards groups), pairing automated execution at the edge with contestable meta-rules and auditable, replaceable discretion. Highly polycentric designs thin the platform layer and push coordination into markets and minimal, auditable rules (fee markets, open listings, plural oracles), improving neutrality and exit but requiring continuous work to diffuse emergent chokepoints (indices, bridges, relays). The patterns observed align with infrastructure/platform research on how control points shape innovation and value capture and with blockchain governance work emphasizing the allocation of decision and control rights. For B2B contexts, the analysis suggests a pragmatic equilibrium. Applications that demand auditability, finality, and accountable remediation (e.g., elections, trade guarantees) gravitate toward monocentric settlements; applications with heterogeneous actors and rapid iteration (e.g., creator and talent markets) benefit from moderately polycentric designs that preserve micro-level determinism with macro-level contestability. Across models, tokenisation expands what can be coordinated, but distributional outcomes hinge on who controls admission, measurement, and upgrade pathways. Accordingly, the thesis proposes design heuristics: separate transaction and platform governance, publish change logs and revocation paths, pluralise attestors at measurement junctions, time-box mandates, and keep credible exit technically and institutionally real. In sum, the dissertation advances an integrated account of Web3 as a political economy of programmable claims and layered governance. It shows how infrastructuring and platformization fold into one another under blockchain conditions, how distinct governance models redistribute rights and rents, and how B2B value propositions depend as much on constitutional design as on code. The framework equips scholars and practitioners to evaluate Web3 systems not by decentralisation rhetoric, but by the concrete allocation of decision rights, boundary resources, and incentives across layers and venues.